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Using the Military at Home: Yesterday,
Today, and Tomorrow
Richard H. Kohn*
Today the United States is undergoing a great transformation in national
security thinking and priorities. Between the end of the Cold War in 1989 and
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the country began to abandon the
policy of containment and the strategy of deterrence that had governed
American relations with the rest of the world for over four decades. For only the
fourth time in its national history, the United States has been changing its
national security policies and reconfiguring its military institutions to adapt to a
new role in world politics.' Once again, for a variety of reasons not least because
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Previous transition periods were: the 1780s to early 1800s when the US created national
military policies and institutions to replace the miitary and naval direction and forces Britain
had provided its colonies, and to create the 19th century constabulary military establishment;
the 1880s to the early 20th century, when the Navy and Army modernized their weapons,
organizations, and doctrines to change from constabularies into war-fighting institutions
planning and preparing in peacetime for mobilization and warfare; and the late 1940s to the
early 1950s, when the United States reorganized the government for national security,
adopted containment and deterrence as its foreign policy and military strategy, and
constructed a large standing military establishment partly deployed overseas, ready for limited
or general war, and stationed in Europe and the Far East. For short, comprehensive
interpretations of the American military experience, see John Shy, The American Military
Expeience: History and Learning, in John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed- Reflections on the
Military Struggle for American Independence 265 (Michigan rev ed 1990); C. Vann Woodward, The
Future of the Past, ch 4 (Oxford 1989). The effort to reorganize the military establishment in
the 1990s can be followed in a series of reviews conducted on the Department of Defense,
see Les Aspin, US Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (1993), portions
available online at <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/index.htm> (visited Mar 4, 2003);
Commn on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Directions for Defense: Report of the
Chicago Journal of International Law
of technologies Americans themselves pioneered, defense of the American
homeland has become central to national security. Protecting the American
people inside the United States is the most significant and perplexing of the
changes underway in national defense. What should be-must be-the role of
the military in homeland defense?
I. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
Until the middle of the 20th century, safeguarding the continental United
States and American territories overseas was the primary mission of the
American military. The very first American military forces, the colonial militias,
came into existence precisely for the purpose of homeland defense, adapted
from the citizen military forces of early modern England which themselves had
been formed for defense against invasion in the absence of a standing army. In
North America beginning in the second quarter of the 17th century, colonial
governments required the service of the able-bodied white male population to
muster periodically, keep arms, train, and embody not only for defense but for
offensive expeditions against hostile Indian tribes. In the 18th century, during
the wars between England and France for imperial domination, the threat
metastasized into the combined invasion of French and sometimes Spanish
forces from the sea as well as on land. The scale and scope of these conflicts
forced the colonies to depend on British military forces, and on occasion to fully
mobilize the human and material resources of their own populations. So focused
on defense were these militia forces that they were almost always restricted by
law to service within the colony. At the same time, volunteers or men drafted
from the units were used for offensive expeditions to attack Indian tribes, or to
seize the seaports, cities, or fortifications of other European powers in the new
world.2
Through the 19th century, these local militias-either in the form of the
enrolled units (the entire militia of a colony or state), a group of individual
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Executive Summary ES-1-ES-9 (1995),
available online at <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/corm95/dil062.html> (visited Mar 4,
2003); William S. Cohen, US Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review
(1997), available online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/index.html> (visited Mar
4, 2003); NatI Def Panel, Transforming Defense: National Secur!i in the 21st Century (1997),
available online at <http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/FultDoc2.pdf> (visited Mar 17, 2003); US
Commn on Nad Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Secuity: Imperative for Change:
The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Securiy/21st Centuy (2001), available
online at <http://www.nssg.gov/PhaseIIIFR.pdf> (visited Mar 8, 2003).
2 For surveys of the militia and colonial wars, see John K. Mahon, Histogy of the Militia and the
National Guard 6-34 (Macmillan 1983); Douglas Edward Leach, Ams for Empire: A Military
Histoy of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763 (Macmillan 1973). For examples of
the extent of mobilization of the population during the colonial period, see Fred Anderson,
A People's Arng: Massachusetts Soldiers and Sociey in the Seven Years' War (North Carolina 1984);
Harold E. Selesky, War and Sodqy in Colonial Connecticut (Yale 1990).
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volunteers, drafted individuals, or through the concept of a citizen's obligation
to serve when required-formed the basis of American military power. After the
Civil War, with the creation of state national guards (volunteer militia), the
militias began their transformation into the war-fighting reserves of the regular
armed forces.' Beginning in the 1970s, the reserves became even more closely
aligned with the regulars in the "Total Force" policy; 4 some ground units were
assigned to fill out regular Army divisions to make them ready for combat, and
some support functions like civil affairs migrated almost entirely into the reserve
components.' In the case of the Air Force, reserve forces grew increasingly
integrated into virtually all the combat and support operations of the regulars
over a generation's time.6 In the 1990s, National Guard and reserve ground
forces began to supplement regular Army forces in peacekeeping and peace
enforcement duties overseas, an unprecedented use of reserves in constabulary
duties in addition to their other duties.' The Guard and Reserve leadership
grasped every mission available to prove the military importance of reserve
forces and to acquire the most resources and most modern weapons possible.'
The regulars, stretched thin after the Cold War by numerous foreign
interventions and peacekeeping operations, welcomed the relief from the
stresses that a high operational tempo had placed on their personnel and
equipment.9 Yet through the 20th century, the National Guard remained state
forces, no matter how closely monitored, trained, organized, or shaped by the
3 See Mahon, Histoy of the Militia and the National Guard at 110 (cited in note 2). For a general
discussion, see also id at 108-24.
4 See id at 253-256, 265; Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice the Citizen: A Histoy
of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983 211-17 (Office of the Chief, Army Reserve 1984);
Charles Joseph Gross, Prelude to the Total Force: The Air National Guard, 1943-1969 3, 166-72
(Office of Air Force History, USAF 1985); Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A Histog of the
Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 249-57 (Air Force History and Museums Program 1997).
5 Gary Hart, The Minuteman: Restoring an Army of the People 140-43 (Free Press 1998).
6 See Mahon, Histoy of the Militia and the National Guard at 254 (cited in note 2). For a general
discussion, see also Gross, Prelude to the Total Force (cited in note 4); Cantwell, Citizen Airmen
(cited in note 4).
See David T. Fautua, How the Guard and Reserve WillFight in 2025, Parameters 127, 129 (Spring
1999); David T. Fautua, Army CitiZen-Soldiers: Active, Guard, and Reserve Leaders Remain Silent
About Overuse of Reserve Components, Armed Forces J Intl 72 (Sept 2000); Joshua Kucera, U.S.
Bosnia Force Now Made Up Only of Guard, Reserve Units, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette A10 (Dec 8,
2002); Faye Fiore, A Couno That's in Fatigues: In Alabama, One Place Will Sacrifice Like No Other
if War Comes; Police, Teachers, Even a Mayor, Are Set to Deploy, Leaving Critical Gaps, LA Times Al
(Jan 21, 2003); Karen Scrivo, Report Says National Guard Strained by New Demands, Natl J Cong
Daily (Feb 19, 2003).
s See Fautua, Armed Forces J Ind at 74 (cited in note 7).
9 See id at 72; Kucera, U.S. Bosnia Force Now Made Up Only of Guard, Reserve Units, Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette at A10 (cited in note 7).
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federal government, or how completely focused they became on war-fighting in
doctrine, organization, training, and weapons."
Furthermore, going back to the beginning of American history, American
military forces, both militia and regular, fulfilled internal domestic functions as
well, particularly the maintenance of order when local and state law enforcement
institutions proved inadequate. The framers of the Constitution agreed, as one
put it after the Constitutional Convention, that "[n]o government can be stable,
which hangs on human inclination alone, unbiased by the fear of coercion.""
While they disagreed about the extent to which government depended on
military power to keep order and enforce its will, they were agreed that regular
forces must remain in the background. "Force," according to Alexander
Hamilton, "may be understood [as] a coertion of laws or coertion of ans."'2 For the
normal functioning of society, law would compel obedience and keep order. If
that were to fail, then the power of the community would act in the form of
police or sheriffs forces, or in extremity, the militia. If that failed, then the
regular forces would be called out as the last resort: "when resistance to the laws
required it," James Madison told the Virginia ratifying convention, in order to
prevent "society from being destroyed."' 3 As far as the internal use of military
power was concerned, the Constitution favored very specifically militia rather
than regulars. Congress' power read: "To provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union" and "suppress Insurrections.' 4
Militias have been used throughout American history to keep order and to
enforce the laws. State forces suppressed rebellions in western Pennsylvania in
1794 and in Rhode Island in 1841; intervened in coal mine strikes in
Pennsylvania and Colorado early in the 20th century, and in a famous textile
strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts, in 1912; mobilized to stop a lynching in
Mississippi in 1904, to quarantine Arizona against California cattle with hoof-
and-mouth disease in the early 1920s, and to stop violence in the
longshoreman's strike in San Francisco in 1934. In the decade from 1886-1895
alone, a time of intense industrial strife, state governors called out the Guard
over three hundred times.' In the South an additional militia role developed,
10 See Fautua, Parameters at 130-31 (cited in note 7). For a general discussion, see also Mahon,
History of the Militia and the National Guard (cited in note 2); Gross, Prelude to the Total Force
(cited in note 4); Cantwell, Citizen Airmen (cited in note 4).
11 Quotation is from the original documents as noted in a more extended analysis in Richard H.
Kohn, The Constitution and National SecutTi: The Intent of the Framers, in Richard H. Kohn, ed,
The United States Military Under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989 61, 67 (NYU
1991) (quoting Edmund Randolph).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 US Const, art I, § 8, ci 15.
is For short overviews of the use of the militia domestically, see Robert W. Coakley, Federal Use
of Militia and the National Guard in Civil Disturbances: The Whiskey Rebellion to Little Rock, in
Vol. 4 No. 1
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adapted from sugar plantations in Barbados in the 17th century Caribbean: to
police slavery through the prevention of insurrection, regulation of slave
movement and gatherings, and the apprehension of runaway slaves by means of
regular patrols in towns and the countryside-practices that lasted over a
century and a half to the end of the Civil War, and that continued illegally
against African-Americans by the Ku Klux Klan and other terrorist or vigilante
groups during Reconstruction."
The regular armed forces, created in the 1780s and 1790s after American
Independence, fulfilled similar missions of homeland defense and internal order.
For over a century, the Army garrisoned frontier and seacoast forts to occupy
American territory, control strategic points of transportation and
communication, and prevent or slow invasions of more populated areas.'7 Until
its modernization at the end of the 19th century and the adoption of doctrines
emphasizing command of the sea and the destruction of invading forces in fleet
actions, the Navy focused on harassment of hostile forces, raiding enemy
commercial shipping, and the defense of American coasts and harbors. Even the
new fleet strategy was predicated on stopping enemy forces from invading the
United States. As late as the eve of World War II, with hemispheric defense the
basis of American war planning, even such offensive forces as the strategic
bomber fleets being planned by the Army Air Corps were being justified to
Congress and the American people as defenses that could attack enemy fleets
heading for North America. 8 Only during and after the Cold War did American
strategy call for defending the country and advancing American interests by
positioning forces abroad and going on the offensive. Even then, a sizable slice
of American military power-strategic nuclear forces, air defenses, portions of
the National Guard and reserves-was configured deliberately to prevent attack
on American soil or respond to it in some way.
Robin Higham, ed, Bayonets in the Streets: The Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances 17 (Kansas
1969); Clarence C. Clendenen, Super Police: The National Guard as a Law-Enforcement Ageny in
the Twentieth Centugy, in Higham, supra at 85.
16 Sally E. Hadden, Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas 12-13, 16-24, 30-
32, 35-47, 206-220 (Harvard 2001).
17 The deployment of the Army can be conveniently viewed in Francis Paul Prucha, A Guide to
the Militay Posts of the United States 1789-1895 6-7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 22, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35
(State Historical Society of Wisconsin 1964). See also Emanuel Raymond Lewis, Seacoast
Fortifications of the United States: An Introductog History (Smithsonian 1970); Robert B. Roberts,
Encyclopedia of Historic Forts: The Military, Pioneer, and Trading Posts of the United States (Macmillan
1988).
18 For interwar planning, see Louis Morton, Germany First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in
World War II, in Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed, Command Decisions 11 (Office of the Chief of
Military History, Dept of the Army 1960); Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy
to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Naval Institute 1991); David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heaty
Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945, ch 11 (Cornell 1998); Mark A. Stoler, Allies
and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II, chs
1-2 (North Carolina 2000).
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Moreover, the regular armed forces have always fulfilled internal,
constabulary functions, even in the 20th century after they had recast themselves
into war-fighting organizations designed to combat the military establishments
of the great powers. 9 The Army explored the West, enforced Jefferson's
embargo laws (or tried to), mapped and surveyed railroad routes, implemented
government policy toward the Indians, enforced federal law over the Mormons,
captured fugitive slaves, intervened to restore order during the era of industrial
and labor strife into the 1920s, restored order during race riots, dispersed Bonus
marchers in the nation's capital in 1932, ran Civilian Conservation Corps camps,
guarded interned Japanese Americans during World War II, fought forest fires,
dredged rivers and harbors, built dams and flood control systems, and fed and
sheltered Americans displaced by fires, floods, and earthquakes. Disaster
assistance became "so commonplace" that "by the 1960s," according to one
historian, "few seasons passed without some involvement in flood, hurricane,
tornado, blizzard, or other form of help for civilians in emergencies., 2 The
Navy mapped and charted coastal areas and distant seas, chased pirates,
suppressed the slave trade, negotiated foreign agreements, safeguarded
Americans and their interests overseas, promoted and protected American
commerce, and fostered scientific research. Marines guarded diplomats and the
US mails,2 suppressed riots, fought fires, and, like the other services, engaged in
disaster relief. The Air Force has provided search and rescue, aerial photography,
humanitarian airlift, medical evacuation, and disaster relief throughout its
history.22
Many of these internal roles receded into the background after World War
II because the armed forces (including the National Guard and reserves) became
absorbed by foreign war-fighting, preparing to intervene abroad or to wage
limited wars as part of the Cold War. Nation-building and exploration were no
19 For a recent overview of the military's historical role in providing a broad array of functions
all in the name of homeland defense, see John S. Brown, Defending the Homeland: An Historical
Perspective, Joint Forces Q 10 (Summer 2002).
20 B. Franklin Cooling, The Arny and Flood and Disaster Relief in Robin Higham and Carol
Brandt, eds, The United States Army in Peacetime: Essays in Honor of the Bicentennial, 1775-1975
61, 73 (Military Affairs/Aerospace Historian 1975).
21 For a brief note on the Marines' defense against mail robberies, see Edwin Howard
Simmons, The United States Marines: A Histog 112 (Naval Institute 3d ed 1998).
22 For a historical look at some of the internal constabulary roles played by the various
branches of the armed forces, consider Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army
(Indiana enlarged ed 1984); Simmons, The United States Marines (cited in note 21); Kenneth J.
Hagan, ed, In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval Histoy, 1775-1978 (Greenwood
1978); Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, eds, Against All Enemies. Intetpretations of
American Military History From Colonial Times to the Present (Greenwood 1986); Clayton D.
Laurie and Ronald H. Cole, The Role ofFederal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877-1945
(Center of Military History, US Army 1997); Maurer Maurer, Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919-
1939 131-48, 299-317, 422-26, 443-44 (Office of Air Force History, USAF 1987).
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longer necessary or desirable because they distracted the armed forces from the
capacity to win high-tech, high-tempo military conflicts against foreign
adversaries, particularly Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. After World War II,
industrial strife diminished, and except for some notable instances of racial
conflict-either urban riots or southern resistance to school desegregation-
violence and disorder on a scale that overpowered local and state law
enforcement institutions declined in frequency.
Yet the armed forces never quite succeeded in evading some domestic
functions. Since World War II, the National Guard has been activated
innumerable times by state governors or by the President to quell riots, enforce
racial integration, prevent looting in the wake of natural disasters, or for other
purposes of internal order. Disaster assistance, fighting forest fires, keeping
order, coping with anti-Vietnam War violence, and many other internal activities
involved the American military episodically throughout the last half of the 20th
century. Army units manned antiaircraft missile defenses around American cities
in the 1950s and 1960s while squadrons of air defense fighters maintained
readiness to intercept Soviet bombers. Regular Army units at Ft. Lewis,
Washington, were even pressed into the hunt for "D.B. Cooper," the legendary
criminal who hijacked a jetliner over the Northwest, parachuted out of it, and
disappeared with the $200,000 ransom he extorted out of the FBI.23 Ground
forces were still called upon to cope with race riots and resistance to school
desegregation in Arkansas, Mississippi, and Alabama, and to support other state
and federal organizations in time of need. Beginning in the late 1980s, the Army
and Air Force were pressed into service to assist in the "war" on drugs in
interdicting shipments headed for American shores, and in some instances to
assist in the effort to halt illegal immigration along the border with Mexico.24 On
the eve of 9/11, the reserve forces had just begun to consider reevaluating their
roles and missions. The regular forces, although under great pressure by the new
Bush administration to "transform," had done little to alter their doctrine,
weapons, or organization to meet the challenges of the 21st century security
environment. Neither regulars nor reserves had even begun to seriously
contemplate homeland defense, a term hardly known to the armed forces of the
23 E-mail from Andrew J. Bacevich, Director, Center for International Relations, Boston
University, to author (Feb 27, 2003) (on file with author) (Bacevich was stationed at Ft.
Lewis at the time and participated in the search); Sam Skolnik, 30 Years Ago, D.B. Cooper's
Night Leap Began a Legend, Seattle Post-Intelligencer Al (Nov 22, 2001).
24 See Matthew Carlton Hammond, Note, The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of Renewal,
75 Wash U L Q 953, 953-54, 972 (1997); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The Thick Green i'ne: The
Growing Involvement of Militagy Forces in Domeslic Law Enforcement, in Peter B. Kraska, ed,
Militariring the American CriminalJustice System: The Changing Roles of the Armed Forces and the Police
29, 31-32 (Northeastern 2001).
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United States when the airplanes struck the Pentagon and felled two of the three
tallest buildings in the country on September 11, 2001.25
II. SINCE 9/11
The attacks of September 2001 quickly forced the military establishment to
think anew and act on the internal role that had so declined in relative
importance. Air National Guard and regular Air Force fighter planes scrambled
to intercept the hijacked airliners heading for the Pentagon and over
Pennsylvania. Even in the reduced level of threat before that tragic day, the
North American Aerospace Defense Command ("NORAD") operated air
defense fighters regularly assigned and on alert to protect American air space,
but with almost no concept of defense against terrorists using aircraft as
weapons of destruction and no intention of flying regular interceptor patrols
over American cities, which became routine for months after, and continues
intermittently, albeit with reduced numbers of sorties, today. "Operation Noble
Eagle isn't an operation," Secretary of the Air Force James Roche informed an
audience during the increased homeland defense threat level of "Code Orange"
in February 2003. "Ladies and gentlemen, it's our future. It's never going
,,26
away.
From the beginning of the crisis on 9/11, the armed forces rushed to
support the state and local agencies responding to the disaster-as armed forces
have been doing for most of American history. According to the Bush
administration's Naional Strategy for Homeland Security document issued in July
2002, "New Jersey and New York guardsmen and Navy and Marine Corps
reservists provided medical personnel to care for the injured, military police to
assist local law enforcement officials, key asset protection, transportation,
communications, logistics, and a myriad of other functions to support recovery
efforts in New York City. '27 In Washington, Maryland Guardsmen sent military
police for security at the Pentagon. Nationwide, over 7,000 National Guard
25 For a sense of the debate over homeland defense before 9/11, see Aaron Weiss, When Terror
Strikes, Who Should Respond?, Parameters 117 (Autumn 2001). The author was a member of a
seminar in Maclean, Virginia, organized by Booz Allen Hamilton for the Department of
Defense's Reserve Forces Policy Board, Seminar on the National Guard and Reserves in the 21st
Centugy: Recommendations for the Total Force Pohif - 2025 (Sept 5, 2001). The author was also a
member of the National Security Study Group, a collection of national security scholars and
practitioners that assisted the US Commission on National Security/21st Century (the "Hart-
Rudman Commission"), which recommended in March 2001 the creation of a cabinet
department for homeland defense. See US Commn on Natl Security/21st Century, Road Map
for National Security at 10-29 (cited in note 1).
26 The Sound of Freedom: Everlasting Inside the Pentagon (Feb 20, 2003).
27 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategvfor Homeland Securiy 44 Quly 2002), available
online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/na._strat-hls.pdf> (visited Mar 7,
2003).
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began patrolling 429 commercial airports and soon, Guardsmen began
supplementing Customs Service and Immigration Service officers at US borders.
At West Point, the need to protect the installation twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week, so overwhelmed the Military Academy's local security details
that the faculty-even one general-took turns as gate guards until the National
Guard could be put in place.28 Between 9/11 and early February 2003, some
170,000 Guardsmen and reservists were activated at one time or another to
supplement border security, protect airports, guard military bases and civilian
installations such as power plants and bridges, protect the population at special
sporting or civic events, and for other purposes of homeland defense.29 For the
first time, Army reservists were to guard US Air Force bases.30 As the armed
forces mobilized and deployed for a campaign against Iraq, the numbers
exceeded 150,000 by mid-February 2003, and may reach as high as 250,000
people on active duty.31 The Secretary of Defense ordered a change in the
missions of the regulars and reserves: the active duty regular forces were to
concentrate on overseas missions, including those that had in recent years been
migrating to the reserves, and reserve forces were to focus on defense inside the
United States. As the Pentagon's "transformation" chief, retired Navy Vice
Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, put it, the "post-9/11 reality" is "that we need a new
way to rebalance our overseas interests and our concern for homeland
security.
' 32
The Coast Guard, the nation's fifth armed service formed in 1915 from a
merger of the Revenue Cutter and Life Saving Services, underwent a
metamorphosis. From a law enforcement institution operating under the
Transportation Department devoted to catching smugglers, enforcing fisheries
28 E-mail from Captain Kevin Clark, Instructor, United States Military Academy (West Point),
to author (Mar 29, 2003) (on file with author).
29 In its early 2003 budget document, the Administration listed "8,000 National Guard at
baggage screening checkpoints at 420 major airports." George W. Bush, Securing the Homeland,
Strengthening the Nation 4 (2002), available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/
homeland/homeland security-book.pdf> (visited Mar 7, 2003). See also Lieutenant Colonel
Daniel J. Shanahan, The Army's Role in Homeland Securioy, in Williamson Murray, ed,
Transformation Concepts for National Security in the 21st Century 285, 295-98 (Strategic Studies
Institute 2002).
30 Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, Inside the Ring, Wash Times A7 (Dec 13, 2002).
31 To see the speed of the buildup in February 2003, compare National Guard and Reservists Now
on Duy Exceed 110,000, Miami Herald 20A (Feb 6, 2003); Thomas E. Ricks and Vernon
Loeb, Unrivaled Militagy Feels Strains of Unending War: For U.S. Fores, a Technological Revolution
and a Constant Call to Do More, Wash Post Al (Feb 16, 2003). See also Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.,
Weekend Warriors No More, 34 Natl J 1690 (une 8, 2002). Reserve components make up 47
percent of the entire military establishment; for the Army, reserve components actually
outnumber the regulars, 550,000 to 480,000. Michael Kilian, Reserves Turning Into Active Force:
Iraq War WouldAdd to Civilian Burden, Chi Trib § 1, at 1 (Nov 20, 2002).
32 Vince Crawley, Changing of the Guard: Revised Missions, Chain-of-Command Pattern Emerging, Army
Times 23 (Nov 25, 2002).
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statutes, interdicting illegal drugs, and providing maritime safety services to
Americans on coasts, lakes, and inland waterways, the Coast Guard almost
overnight became an antiterrorist force charged with security for the nation's
ports and sea frontiers. Now it is part of the new Department of Homeland
Security. Its aged fleet of aircraft, ships, and boats will be replaced or upgraded
as quickly as possible, a recapitalization of at least seventeen billion dollars over
the next two decades, "the largest contract for new assets ever awarded in Coast
Guard history."33
Since 9/11 the White House and Justice Department have used the military
establishment to incarcerate and interrogate suspected terrorists and "enemy
combatants" and keep them beyond the reach of the civilian judicial system,
even if they are American citizens, in order to collect intelligence and prevent
future attacks. The threat to try terrorists in military commissions under the
authority of an Executive Order that severely restricted the individual rights of
the detainees, seemed at the time it was issued (barely two months after 9/11)
grounded as much in expediency as necessity.34 Repudiated by a committee of
the American Bar Association, the Executive Order was softened by rules
33 Jacquelyn Zettles, Interview With the Commandant, Coast Guard Mag 10 (Aug 2002). For a
review of the new ships and aircraft, see id at 30-57; Renae Merle, For the Coast Guard Fleet, a
$15 Billion Upgrade: Agency's Profile, and Its Duties, Have Grown Since Sept. 11, Wash Post A3
0 une 25, 2002). "We were always involved in homeland defense," said the commander of the
14th Coast Guard District in Hawaii, Rear Admiral Ralph Utley. "But on Sept. 10 it only
took up 2 percent of our time. By Sept. 12, it was up to 58 percent." Gregg K. Kakesako,
9/11 Changed Coast Guard: The Terrorist Attacks Force a Shift in Priotides From Rescues to Maritime
and Harbor Security, Honolulu Star-Bulletin (Sept 8, 2002). Nationally, the change in the "port
security mission" was from "1-2 percent of daily operations to between 50-60 percent today
[February 20021," Bush, Securing the Homeland at 18 (cited in note 29). See also The Coast Guard
& Homeland Securi[y. A New America, CD-ROM video, enclosed in a letter from Rear Admiral
K.J. Eldridge, Assistant Commandant for Governmental and Public Affairs, US Coast
Guard, to author (Feb 21, 2003) (on file with author). A short history of the Coast Guard can
be found in John Whiteclay Chambers II, et al, eds, The Oxford Companion to American Military
History 144-46 (Oxford 1999).
34 See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
66 Fed Reg 57833 (2001); President Bush's Order on the Trial of Terrorists by Military Commission,
NY Times B8 (Nov 14, 2001). For early reaction, see William Safire, Kangaroo Courts, NY
Times A17 (Nov 26, 2001); Susan Schmidt and Bradley Graham, Military Trial Plans Nearly
Done; Bush to Decide Which Detainees Will Be Tried by Tribunals, Wash Post A10 (Nov 18, 2001);
George Lardner, Jr., Legal Scholars Critiize Wording of Bush Order: Accused Can Be Detained
Indefinitey, Wash Post A10 (Dec 3, 2001); Hearing on DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our
Freedoms while Defending against Terrorism before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
107th Cong, 1st Sess (Nov 28, 2001) (statement of Scott L. Silliman, Executive Director,
Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security, Duke University School of Law), available
online at <http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=126&witid=70> (visited Mar 7,
2003);Jeanne Cummings, White House Counsel's Methods Outrage Military Legal Experts, Wall StJ
A4 (Nov 26, 2002).
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governing its implementation drawn up by the Pentagon.3" At the same time, the
government designated prisoners captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan as
"unlawful enemy combatants" outside the provisions of the Geneva Convention
on prisoners of war.36 They have been incarcerated at the US Marine Corps base
at Guantanamo, Cuba, precisely because that facility is beyond the reach of
American courts. That detention has since been essentially sanctioned by two
United States District Courts.3" Two American citizens held in Navy prisons in
Norfolk, Virginia, and Charleston, South Carolina, since April and June of 2002,
have not been charged with crimes nor have they been allowed access to legal
representation, an apparent violation of their constitutional rights. Efforts to
allow them access to legal counsel have been opposed by the government and
rebuffed by the judiciary, without any declaration or admission of the suspension
of the right of habeas corpus by either Congress or the Executive Branch. This
legal limbo was expressly sought by the government for the purposes of
domestic security and intelligence collection but condemned by the American
Bar Association.
38
Perhaps the greatest change in the armed forces after 9/11 occurred not in
operations or deployments or use of military legal institutions but in
organizational changes inside the Department of Defense. Because intelligence is
so critical to preventing terrorism, the Department has a new Undersecretary for
Intelligence, a role to be filled by Stephen Cambone, Secretary Rumsfeld's most
trusted lieutenant for "transformation." A new Assistant Secretary for
35 John Mintz, U.S. Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals; New Rules Also Allow Leeway on Evidence, Wash
Post Al (Mar 21, 2002); Jess Bravin, U.S. Prepares Tribunal System to Prosecute Alleged Terrorists,
Wall StJ A8 (Dec 10, 2002); Jess Bravin, Crimes Qualjingfor Militay Tribunals Are Set, Wall St
J A2 (Feb 28, 2003).
36 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War, 6 UST 3316 (1956).
37 See American Bar Association, Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants, Criminal
Justice Section, Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Report to the House of
Delegates 3 n 8 (Feb 2003), available online at <http://www.abanet.org/leadership/recom
mendations03/109.pdf> (visited Mar 20, 2003); Paisley Dodds, U.S. Defends Guantanamo
Detenions, AP Online (Jan 17, 2003); Armstrong Starkey, The Prisoners, 4 Historically Speaking
32-33 (Nov 2002).
38 See American Bar Association, Report to the House of Delegates at 1 (cited in note 37)
(Resolutions approved by the Association's House of Delegates call for "meaningful judicial
review of their status" such as to accommodate the needs of the detainee and the
requirement of national security, for legal representation "in connection with the opportunity
for such review," and for "Congress, in coordination with the Executive Branch, to establish
clear standards and procedures governing the designation and treatment of U.S. citizens and
other[s] ... detained ... as 'enemy combatants."'). For the most recent court ruling, see Neil
A. Lewis, The Courts.- Detention Upheld in Combatant Case, NY Times Al (Jan 9, 2003); Hamdi v
Rumsfeld, 316 F3d 450 (4th Cir 2003); Anthony Lewis, Marbug v. Madison v. Ashcroft, NY
Times A17 (Feb 24, 2003). Contrast with a defense of the government position in Ruth
Wedgwood, Rule of Law: Lawyers at War, Wall St J A22 (Feb 18, 2003). See also Deborah R.
Finn, Ruth Wedgwood, and Stewart Baker, Muhammed Saleem, and Suzanne Evans, Letters
to the Editor, Balancing Libery and Security, NY Times A30 (Feb 27, 2003).
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Homeland Defense has also come into existence to coordinate planning and
activities inside the Office of the Secretary. Most importantly, in response to a
recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense revised
the Unified Command Plan, the document governing the organization and
responsibilities of the nation's military forces worldwide, to create a command in
North America to protect the United States. Northern Command will
"consolidate ... existing missions that were previously executed by other military
organizations. The command's mission is homeland defense and civil support,
specifically ... to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the
United States, its territories, and interests ... including consequence
management operations" with whatever forces are "assigned ... by the
President., 39 Northern Command's head (dual-hatted as NORAD commander),
Air Force General Ralph Eberhart, not only plans and prepares operations to
help civilian "first responders" after an attack, but also engages in military
operations on and over "the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico,
and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles" including
"the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands."4
What seemed to be major but essentially bureaucratic alterations
represented in reality a transformation of American national security thinking: a
greater concern about domestic safety than foreign attack, about internal threats
than external war, about the murder of American citizens in large numbers and
the harming of American institutions, installations, landmarks, and physical and
39 US Northern Command, Who WeAre-Mission, available online at <http://www.northcom.
mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.whoweare&section=3> (visited Apr 6, 2003). For the new
intelligence position, see Thomas Duffy, New DOD Intel Directorate Will Have Broad Poliy,
Program Influence, Inside the Pentagon (Mar 27, 2003). For Northern Command and its
background, see Bruce M. Lawlor, Military Support of CivilAuthorities-A New Focus for a New
Millennium, J Homeland Security (Oct 2000, updated Sept 2001), available online at
<http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Lawlor.htm> (visited Feb 28, 2003)
(Lawlor, an army major general with a law degree, was the first commanding general of
"Joint Task Force-Civil Support," a headquarters begun in October 1999 to command
"Department of Defense consequence-management forces in support of a civilian lead
federal agency following a weapon of mass destruction incident in the United States, its
territories, or its possessions." Currently he is Chief of Staff to Tom Ridge, the head of the
Department of Homeland Security); Bradley Graham, Militagy Favors a Homeland Command;
Forces May Shift to Patrolling U.S., Wash Post Al (Nov 21, 2001); Thomas E. Ricks, Northern
Command to Defend the U.S.: Pentagon Reveals Shift in Strncture, Wash Post A8 (Apr 18, 2002);
News Call, Pentagon Realigns Militagy Structure: U.S. Northern Command Will Be Activated in
October, Army Mag (June 2002), available online at <http://www.ausa.org/www/armymag.
nsf/(news)/20026?OpenDocument> (visited Mar 20, 2003); Elaine M. Grossman, Defense
Offirials Close to Naming New Homeland Security Command, Inside the Pentagon (Dec 6, 2002);
Elaine M. Grossman, Rumsfeld Envisions New Command Responsible for Homeland Security, Inside
the Pentagon (Jan 17, 2002); DOD to Establish Permanent Homeland Securiy OganiZation;
Cambone Leads Transition Team, InsideDefense.com (Mar 12, 2002).
40 US Northern Command, Who We Are-H-Iomefront, available online at <http://www.
northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.whoweare&section=4> (visited Apr 6, 2003).
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electronic infrastructure at home rather than war with foreign nations.
"Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental
commitment of the Federal Government," the President declared in issuing his
first National Securiy Strategy, a year after 9/11. "Today, that task has changed
dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial
capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can
bring great chaos and suffering to our shores ... turn[ing] the power of modern
technologies against us. ... The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the
crossroads of radicalism and technology."4
III. THE FUTURE
The danger posed by the use of the regular military forces internally is dual:
on the one hand, impairing military effectiveness in the primary task of the
regulars today, war-fighting overseas; and on the other hand, undermining civil
liberty (as has happened in past wars) by using regular troops for law
enforcement, to try or incarcerate American citizens, to gather intelligence, or to
suppress dissent or antiwar protest.
On the surface, there seems little ground for worry. The creation of a
civilian cabinet department of homeland security charged with overall
responsibility for preventing and dealing with the consequences of further
attacks suggests that the military would not assume inappropriate authority over
the population even in catastrophic circumstances. Expressing sensitivity about
using the military at home, The National Homeland Security Strategy issued in the
summer of 2002 listed only limited roles for the armed forces internally:
1. conventional military activities in those "extraordinary" situations
"such as combat air patrols or maritime defense operations" where
the military "would take the lead in defending people" and American
"territory" with support "by other agencies";
2. "responding" to "emergencies such as ... an attack or ... forest fires,
floods, tornadoes, or other catastrophes," for which the Defense
Department would react "quickly to provide capabilities that other
agencies do not have"; and
3. "limited scope" situations "where other agencies have the lead-for
example, security at a special event like the recent Olympics."42
The Defense Department has shunned a wider role for the military in law
enforcement. "[F]rankly I don't think the American people want to see the
military performing a domestic law enforcement function," Deputy Secretary of
41 Preface to The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sept 2002), available
online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (visited Mar 4, 2003).
42 National Strategy for Homeland Secu ry at 25 (cited in note 27).
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Defense Paul Wolfowitz has stated. While there would be much "close handing
off of information both ways" between the Defense Department and
intelligence agencies and the FBI, "when it comes to doing a wiretap on a
domestic suspect, I don't think people want the Defense Department doing
that., 3 Likewise General Eberhart voiced genuine sensitivity to civil liberties:
"We also understand Civics 101," he told a reporter. "I really don't think ... the
military will be doing things that should be done by other agencies ... ."" The
Northern Command's website contains explicit pages on "Limitations" and
"Operating with the Law.",
45
Yet the behavior of the Bush administration in the fight against terrorism is
anything but reassuring. The conservative columnist George Will, listing some of
the radical changes inherent in many administration foreign and domestic
policies and proposals, observed that "America has a president unusually
comfortable contemplating, and pushing, change."46 Attorney General John
Ashcroft, in a single statement at a National Security Council meeting the day
after 9/11, altered the primary mission of the Justice Department and the FBI
from law enforcement to antiterrorism-without comment from the President.
47
"The president had made clear to Ashcroft in an earlier conversation that he
wanted to make sure an attack like the ones on the Pentagon and World Trade
Center never happened again," reported the Washington Post's Bob Woodward.
"It was essential to think unconventionally. Now, Ashcroft was saying, the focus
of the FBI and the Justice Department should change from prosecution to
prevention, a radical shift in priorities."
'4 8
The administration apparently presumed that protecting an open society
against a ruthless, formless, suicidal enemy bent on killing large numbers of
Americans required new thinking and unprecedented measures-and perhaps
heretofore unacceptable new methods. Ashcroft, acting and often speaking for
the administration, has demonstrated a limited sensitivity to civil liberties and,
despite rhetoric to the contrary, scant regard for traditional legal safeguards.
Outgoing House Majority Leader Dick Armey, Republican of Texas, "said he
43 Timothy Dodson, Face to Face: A Conversation With Paul Wolfowitz: 'I Don't Think the One
Problem Can Wait on the Other", Sun-Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale) 5F (Nov 24, 2002).
44 Philip Shenon and Eric Schmitt, The Militay: Meeting Daily, U.S. Nerve Center Prepares for
Terrorists, NY Times A14 (Dec 27, 2002). See also Eric Schmitt and Philip Shenon, Domestic
Defense: GeneralSees Scant Evidence of Close Threat in U.S., NY Times A26 (Dec 13, 2002).
45 See US Northern Command, Who We Are-Limitations, available online at <http://www.
northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.whoweare&section=9> (visited Apr 6, 2003); US
Northern Command, Who WeAre--Operating With the Law, available online at <http://www.
northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.whoweare&section=10> (visited Apr 6, 2003).
46 George Will, Boldly Redeployinlg the Troops, News & Observer (Raleigh) A17 (Feb 13, 2003).
47 Bob Woodward, Bush at War42 (Simon & Schuster 2002).
48 Id.
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thought Mr. Ashcroft and the Justice Department were 'out of control.' 49 A
scholar of the history of the Attorney General's office put it this way: "The
terrorist attacks have energized Ashcroft in a remarkable way, resonating with
his sincere belief that there is evil in the world.,
50
Furthermore, the administration is the most secretive seen in Washington
in decades: "a sea change in government openness," according to a reporter who
consulted "dozens of experts.""1 A November 5, 2001, Executive Order
restricted the release of presidential documents from previous administrations,
angering not only historians and journalists but many in Congress, including
some in the President's own party. 2 A November 13, 2001, Executive Order
authorized military commissions for the purpose of trying enemy combatants in
secret.53 The administration has closed immigration court proceedings to the
public and chosen to keep secret the names of thousands of immigrants swept
up after 9/11 and the names of the prisoners designated "unlawful enemy
combatants" incarcerated at Guantanamo and in Bagram, Afghanistan. The
49 Eric Lichtblau and Adam Liptak, On Terror, Spying and Guns, Ashcrofit Expands Reach, NY
Times A1 (Mar 15, 2003).
so Adam Liptak, Under Ashcroft, Judicial Power Flows Back to Washington, NY Times § 4, at 5 (Feb
16, 2003) (quoting Nancy Baker, associate professor of government at New Mexico State
University). See also Anthony Lewis, Taking Our Liberties, NY Times A15 (Mar 9, 2002);
James A. Barnes, et a, Grading the Cabinet, Natl J 232, 234 (Jan 25, 2003) ("What Attorney
General John D. Ashcroft describes as the Justice Department's 'wartime reorganization and
mobilization' has dramatically shifted its focus from fighting crime in the streets to
preventing another 9/11. ... Ashcroft's aggressive tactics fit the desire within the White
House to rewrite the rule book if that's what it takes to fight the domestic war on
terrorism."). For an indication of Ashcroft's response to the criticism, see Kevin Johnson,
Ashcroft Defends Anti-Terror Tactics, Prosecutors Told to Be ' nrelening" USA Today A 12 (Oct 2,
2002). For an overall assessment of Ashcroft's leadership, see Lichtblau and Liptak, On
Terror, Spying and Guns, Ashcroft Expands Reach, NY Times at Al (cited in note 49).
51 Adam Clymer, Government Openness at Issue as Bush Holds Onto Records, NY Times Al (Jan 3,
2003). See also Lewis, Taking Our Liberties, NY Times at A15 (cited in note 50). In 2001, the
number of document "classification actions ... increased by 44 percent," Information
Security Oversight Office, 2001 Report to the President 2 (Sept 2002), available online at
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/2 001rpt.pdf> (visited Feb 28, 2002).
52 Executive Order 13233: Further Implementation of the Presidential Records Act, 66 Fed Reg
56025 (2001), reprinted in Source Material. Executive Order 13233, 32 Presidential Stud Q 185
(2002) (including the responses of the American Political Science Association and the
American Historical Association); Martha Joynt Kumar, Executive Order 13233: Further
Implementation of the Presidential Records Act, 32 Presidential Stud Q 194-209 (2002). See also
Clymer, Government Openness, NY Times at Al (cited in note 51); Stanley I. Kuder, Presidengy:
An Executive Order Richard Nixon Would Love, Washington Spectator, reprinted in History
News Network (Jan 3, 2002), available online at <http://www.historynewsnetwork.org/
articles/article.html?id=494> (visited Mar 7, 2003); David E. Rosenbaum, Top Secret: When
Government Doesn't Tell, NY Times § 4, at 1 (Feb 3, 2002); Bruce Craig, Bush Issues New Secrey
Executive Order, 9 NCH Washington Update 13 (Mar 27, 2003).
53 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66
Fed Reg 57833 (cited in note 34).
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Attorney General established an interagency task force to reconsider
punishments for leaking classified information, the first such review in two
decades.5 4 The administration has kept all sorts of information away from
Congress, including activating a "shadow" government of civil servants at
"secret underground sites outside Washington to ensure that the federal
government could survive a devastating terrorist attack on the nation's capital."5
At one point, after leaks on Capitol Hill, the President threatened to share
classified information only with the heads of the committees involved in
national security-to the dismay and sometimes outrage of lawmakers, including
Republicans.5
6
Surveillance of American citizens and immigrants has expanded
enormously, but not as much as the administration wished. Two weeks after the
terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the Attorney General suggested
in a White House meeting that Americans spy on each other: "We want to
convey the message that you're likely to be detected if you're doing something
wrong."57 This Terrorism Information and Prevention System ("TIPS"),
described by the Administration as "a nationwide program to help thousands of
American truck drivers, letter carriers, train conductors, ship captains, and utility
workers report potential terrorist activity," 58 appeared so intrusive that Congress
actually prohibited it.59 A program of surveillance targeted at "hundreds of
mostly young, mostly Muslim men" was instituted to find al Qaeda sleeper
agents planted inside the United States.6" The government won broad authority
to use the permission of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to institute
wiretaps and other undercover investigations against suspects, and to use the
information gathered thereby in criminal proceedings, thus erasing a barrier
54 Jerry Seper, Ashcroft Creates Interagency Force on Security Leaks, Some Urge Making It a Felony,
Wash Times A3 (Dec 16, 2001). See also Jack Nelson, U.S. Government Secrey and the Current
Crackdown on Leaks, Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy,
Working Paper No 2003-1 (Harvard 2002), available online at <http://www.ksg.harvard.
edu/presspol/publications/Nelson.pdf> (visited Mar 7, 2003).
55 Amy Goldstein and Juliet Eilperin, Congress Not Advised of Shadow Government; Bush Calls
Securiy "Serious Business", Wash Post Al (Mar 2, 2002).
56 Laurence McQuillan, For Bush, Secret Isa Matter ofLoyalty, USA Today Al (Mar 14, 2002). See
also Steve Chapman, Excessive Secrey in the War on Terror: How Can We Judge Whether President
Bush and John Ashcroft Have Acted Responsibhy When They Refuse to Put All of the Cards on the Table?,
Chi Trib § 2, at 9 (Aug 18, 2002); James G. Lakely, GOP Veterans Rap Secrecy on Defense Issues;
Senators 'Turious" With Rumsfeld, Wash Times Al (Jan 14, 2003); Robert D. Novak, Disaffected
Troops, Wash Post A21 (Jan 13, 2003).
57 Woodward, Bush at War at 169 (cited in note 47).
58 National Strategyfor Homeland Securit at 12 (cited in note 27).
59 Gail Russell Chaddock, Securify Act to Pervade Daily Lives, Christian Sci Monitor 1 (Nov 21,
2002).
60 Philip Shenon and David Johnston, The Investigation: Seeking Terrorist Plots, the FB.L Is Tracking
Hundreds of Muslims, NY Times § 1, at 1 (Oct 6, 2002).
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protecting the Fourth Amendment guarantee against "unreasonable searches"
and warrants without "probable cause."6 According to one recent analysis,
"[firom New York City to Seattle, police officials are looking to do away with
rules that block them from spying on people and groups without evidence that a
crime has been committed," and "[a]t the same time, federal and local police
agencies are looking for systematic, high-tech ways to root out terrorists before
they strike."62 One Defense Department program provoked national attention
and much anxiety: the Total Information Awareness ("TIA") research effort at
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. TIA would sift thousands of
disparate databases in order to detect suspicious activity in an effort to anticipate
terrorist behavior. The system would "mine" computer records generated by
Americans' private behavior-credit card charges, phone usage, travel behavior,
medical data, e-mail messages, and other evidence of personal behaviors-with
such vast implications for privacy and opportunity for government abuse
(acknowledged by a panel of computer scientists and policy experts who
reviewed the system for the Pentagon) that Congress prohibited further
development without regular reporting to, and oversight from, Capitol Hill.63
Similarly the government, according to one report, plans to require "Internet
service providers to help build a centralized system to enable broad monitoring
of the Internet and, potentially, surveillance of its users."64
Immediately after 9/11, the administration proposed legislation to expand
authority to monitor voice and e-mail messages, broaden the definition of
terrorism, punish people who even unknowingly support or harbor terrorists,
intensify attacks on money laundering that could support terrorism, break down
the barriers between intelligence gathering and criminal investigations, allow the
government authority to detain immigrant suspects indefinitely or expel them
without court review, and permit other heretofore prohibited or unprecedented
police powers. The administration hurried its proposals through the House and
Senate a month after 9/11, and when both chambers balked at the extremity of
61 Dan Eggen, Broad U.S. Wiretap Powers Upheld; Secret Court Lifts Bar on Terror Suspect Surveillance,
Wash Post Al (Nov 19, 2002); Linda Greenhouse, Opponents Lose Challenge to Government's
Broader Use of Wiretaps to Fight Terrorism, NY Times A12 (Mar 25, 2003); US Const, amend IV.
62 Michael Moss and Ford Fessenden, New Tools for Domestic Spying, and Qualms, NY Times Al
(Dec 10, 2002).
63 See John Markoff, Intelligence: Pentagon Plans a Computer System That Would Peek at Personal Data
of Americans, NY Times A12 (Nov 9, 2002); J. Michael Waller, The Nation: Homeland Securiy:
Fears Mount Over 'Total" Spy System, Insight (Dec 24, 2002), available online at
<http://www.insightmag.com/news/338890.html> (visited Mar 8, 2003); Dan Eggen and
Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Surveillance Plan Worries GOP Senator, Wash Post Al 3 (Jan 22, 2003);
William Safire, Privay Invasion Curtailed, NY Times A41 (Feb 13, 2003); Audrey Hudson,
"Supersnoop" Scheme Blocked Pending Review by Congress; Privay Issues Cited in Pentagon TIA Project,
Wash Times Al (Feb 13, 2003).
64 John Markoff and John Schwartz, Electronic Surveillance: Bush Administration to Propose System for
Wide Monitoring of Internet, NY Times A22 (Dec 20, 2002).
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some of the provisions, the administration attacked the Democrats and
intensified the pressure. In spite of these tactics, Congress insisted on limitations
on the new government authority and sunset provisions for the more intrusive
or authoritarian powers.6" Yet in early 2003, the administration apparently
intended to return to the Congress requesting further expansion of police
powers, provisions for secret arrests and detentions, exceptions from judicial
oversight, and other changes that invade civil liberties, in order to prosecute the
war on terrorism more aggressively.66
If, then, the Bush Administration tilts decidedly in favor of security over
liberty in order to prosecute what top officials see as an extremely difficult,
ambiguous war against a suicidal enemy with no "center of gravity," an enemy
clearly capable of using the American legal system and the openness of
American society to its advantage, it is likely that the military will be used
internally, perhaps in ways that threaten civil liberties or diminish the war-
fighting effectiveness of the regular armed forces. And it is likely that the
American people will support such expedients.67
The dangers are threefold.
First, the federal government might turn to the regular armed forces
because they are handy, convenient, and superficially at least, effective-and
65 For detailed summaries of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, see Elizabeth A. Palmer and
Keith Perine, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill, CQ Wkly 329 (Feb 2, 2002); Bill Summagy and
Status for the 107th Congress, FIR 3162, 107th Cong, 1st Sess, available online at <http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03162:@@@L&summ2=m&> (visited Apr 6,
2003). See also Neil A. Lewis and Robert Pear, Negotiators Back Scaled-Down Bill to Battle Terror;
Speaker Seeks a House Vote Soon-Wiretap Powers to Grow, NY Times Al (Oct 2, 2001); Neil A.
Lewis and Robin Toner, Democrats in Senate Are Pressured on Terror Bill, NY Times B8 (Oct 3,
2001); Neil A. Lewis and Robert Pear, Legislation: Terror Laws Near Votes in House and Senate,
NY Times B8 (Oct 5, 2001); Robin Toner and Neil A. Lewis, Congress. House Passes Terrorism
Bill Much Like Senate's, but Wi/h 5-Year Limit, NY Times B6 (Oct 13, 2001); Adam Clymer,
Aniterrorism Bill Passes; U.S. Gets Expanded Powers; Bush Set to Sign; Measure Provides Tools White
House Sought, Wi/h Some Limits, NY Times Al (Oct 26, 2001); Timothy Lynch, Breaking the
Vicious Cycle: Preserving Our Liberties While Figh/ing Terroism, 443 Policy Analysis (Cato Institute
2002).
66 See Charles Lane, U.S. May Seek WiderAn/i-Terror Powers, Wash Post Al (Feb 8, 2003); Adam
Clymer, Domestic Security: Justice Dept. Draft on Wider Powers Draws Quick Criticism, NY Times
A10 (Feb 8, 2003); Gene R. Nichol, Ashcrofi Wants Even More, News & Observer (Raleigh)
15A (Feb 20, 2003). The administration also intends to try to make the USA PATRIOT Act's
changes permanent. See Eric Lichtblau, Republicans Want Terrorism Law Made Permanent, NY
Times B1 (Apr 9, 2003).
67 For the willingness of the American public, even people traditionally sensitive to civil
liberties, "to give up some of their personal freedoms in order to make the country safe from
terrorist attacks," see Laurie Goodstein, Civil Liberties: Jewish Groups Endorse Tough Security
Laws, NY Times A14 (Jan 3, 2002). Michael Ratner provides a catalog of the Bush
administration's invasions of, and threats to, civil rights and liberties in Moving Toward a Police
State or I-lave We Arrived?: Secret Military Tribunals, Mass Arrests and Disappearances, Wiretapping &
Tor/ure (2002), available online at <http://www.humanrightsnow.org/policestate.htm>
(visited Mar 20, 2003).
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because the civilian agencies involved in homeland defense at various levels of
government are not being funded adequately. The concern is not the ordinary
conduct of the war at home. The use of a military surveillance system to help
local law enforcement catch the Washington area sniper in the fall of 2002 drew
little criticism. Nor did calling up the National Guard to patrol airports or
protect military installations, or supplement the Border Patrol. In fact, re-
orienting and re-ordering the National Guard to focus primarily on homeland
security would be returning it to its traditional role; the hundreds of thousands
of soldiers in the Guard, embedded in 3,100 communities, are the appropriate
pool of military people to prepare for domestic attack.68 They already possess the
links with local responders-in some cases they are the local responders in
civilian life (a duplication that would have to be prohibited): the fire, police,
emergency medical, public health, and other people who provide security and
would react to minimize the damage and begin reconstruction after a terrorist
attack. Other internal military missions such as missile defense and cyber
defense could be assigned to the Guard or reserves. The danger in developing
capabilities in the regular forces for homeland use is that those capabilities
would be most effective in civilian agencies, in the National Guard, or down at
the state and local levels which will respond first to a terrorist attack. One
example is the Marine Corps' Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force,
developed in the mid-1990s in part to help civilian society.69 One of a number of
such organizations in the armed services and scattered across the federal
government, the Force would likely be useless unless it arrived at the scene
within an hour. 0 Experts know that responding to a chemical or biological
attack will first occur at the local level, that speed will be critical, and that state
and local emergency services, police, fire, public health, and government people
need the training, equipment, practice, and staffing if lives are to be saved and
68 Bill Miller, National Guard Awaits Niche in Homeland Security Plan; White House's Caution Chafes
Against Those UTging Action, Wash Post Al 2 (Aug 11, 2002). A call for the redirection of the
National Guard was in the original Phase IiI Hart-Rudman Commission report, Road Mapfor
National Securty at 25-26 (cited in note 1), and is also in Gary Hart, Warren B. Rudman, and
Stephen E. Flynn, America Still Unprepared-America Still in Danger Report of an Independent Task
Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations 34-36 (Council on Foreign Relations 2002),
available online at <http://www.cfr.org/pdf/HomelandSecurityTF.pdf> (visited Apr 6,
2003).
69 See Kwame Holman, The NewsHour With Jim Lehrer: Focus: Guarding the Homeland, PBS
television broadcast (Sept 27, 2002); Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF),
GlobalSecurity.Org, available online at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/
usmc/cbirf.htm> (visited Nov 24, 2002).
70 See Amy E. Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism
Threat and the US Response xiv, Stimson Center Report No 35 (2000), available online at
<http://www.stimson.org/?SN=CB20020111235> (visited Apr 6, 2003); Holman, The
NewsHour With Jim Lehrer: Focus: Guarding the Homeland (cited in note 69).
Spring 2003
Chicago Journal of International Law
panic avoided.71 Another example: should the Army really be training federal
executives to deal with the issues facing them in terrorist attacks just because the
federal executives are ineligible for the Justice Department program offered to
state and local officials?72 The dangers of using or relying on the military are
many: the duplication and waste of resources, the ineffectiveness of the effort,
and the diversion of money, people, and focus from traditional responsibilities
which can diminish the war-fighting effectiveness of a military establishment
already strained by a broad range of missions and commitments.73
A second danger is that the military establishment will be pressed into
service temporarily on a substantial scale for disaster response should the United
States be struck with one or more weapons of mass destruction, or some
massive disruption of our cyber networks that causes multiple or sequential
natural or human disasters-and that the "temporary" would last for a very long
time. The United States remains, eighteen months after 9/11, enormously
vulnerable to attacks on its trade, ports, transportation and cyber systems, power
plants, chemical industry (some 850,000 "facilities that work with hazardous or
extremely hazardous substances"), landmarks, and other sites.74 In the year
before the attacks, "489 million people, 127 million cars and 211,000 boats
71 Smithson and Levy, Ataxia at 113 (cited in note 70). For additional information on training
and equipment programs, an assessment of frontline readiness, and for recommendations on
how to prepare for chemical and biological terrorist threats, see id at 288-303 & chs 5-6.
72 Jason Peckenpaugh, Course Offers Anti-Terrorism Training for Federal Executives, GovExec.com
(Feb 19, 2003), available online at <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0203/021903pl.
htm> (visited Mar 7, 2003).
73 For an example of how stretched one service is to deal with multiple commitments and a
campaign in Iraq, see Elaine M. Grossman, Air Chief Reaches Deeper to Find Forces for Multiple
Wa fronts, Inside the Pentagon (Feb 20, 2003). See also Press Release, United States
Department of Defense, National Guard and Reserve Mobilized as of November 27, 2002 (Nov 27,
2002), available online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2002/b11272002_bt603-
02.html> (visited Apr 6, 2002). During the Afghan campaign, some 83,000 of the 1.25
million Guard/Reserves were on active duty. See Kilian, Reserves Turning Into Activw Force: Iraq
War Would Add to Civilian Burden, Chi Trib § 1, at 1 (cited in note 31). See also Making
Headlines This Week: Debate Swells Over Sending Unarmed Troops to Guard U.S. Borders, Inside the
Air Force (Mar 8, 2002); Hearing on Combating Terrorism: Protecting the United States-
Part II before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International
Relations of the House Committee on Government Reform, Rep No 107-156, 107th Cong,
2d Sess 118 (2002) (statement of Peter Verga, Special Assistant for Homeland Security).
74 The figure for chemical industry sites comes from Smithson and Levy, Ataxia at xiv (cited in
note 70). For general analysis of national vulnerabilities, see id throughout; Hart, Rudman,
and Flynn, America Still Unprepared (cited in note 68); Gilmore Commn, Fourth Annual Report
to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involing Weapons of Mass Destruction: IV. Implementing the National Strategy (2002),
available online at <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror4.pdf> (visited Mar 3, 2003).
See also James Dao, Gaps in Securio: Report Finds U.S. Unprepared for Next Terrorist Attack, NY
Times A15 (Oct 25, 2002); Philip Shenon, Domestic Security: Ridge Discovers SiZe of Home Security
Task, NY Times Al (Mar 3, 2002); Richard Prez-Pefia, A Securiy Blanket, but With No
Guarantees, NY Times Al (Mar 23, 2003).
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passed through our border inspection systems," wrote a Coast Guard
commander who studied the problem and reported to the US Commission on
National Security/21st Century. Little or no additional federal support has
reached the two million local firefighter, emergency service, and law
enforcement first responders who would have to deal with a chemical or
biological attack in their communities.7 6 Nor has the public health system-
federal, state, and local-been adequately improved, expanded, or reformed to
deal with mass casualties.77 Judging from the response of the government to
9/11 and the possibility of mass panic in the event of future attacks-the
reaction to the anthrax and the Washington-area snipers-one can easily imagine
enormous pressure for the use of military forces immediately after a successful
attack. A large outbreak of smallpox might require huge areas to be quarantined,
with checkpoints controlling the movement of the population, requiring
numbers of people that only the military could provide. "[D]epending on the
extent of the outbreak, a quarantine could remain in place-potentially in
multiple U.S. cities or regions simultaneously-for weeks, months or even
years."7 8 "The United States may have to declare martial law someday ... in the
case of a devastating attack with weapons of mass destruction causing tens of
thousands of casualties," retired Army General Wayne A. Downing speculated at
the end of 2002, some six months after leaving the White House as Deputy
75 Stephen E. Flynn, Safer Borders, NY Times A23 (Oct 1, 2001). See also Jamie Dettmer, Special
Report: Tighter Securio in Store for Seaports, Insight (Feb 25, 2002), available online at
<http://www.insightmag.com/news/174891.html> (visited Mar 8, 2003); Hans Binnendijk,
et al, The Virtual Border Countering Seaborne Container Terrorism, 16 Defense Horizons (2002),
available online at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH16/DH16.pdf> (visited Mar 20,
2003).
76 The President's 2003 budget submitted in February 2002 called for an additional $3.5 billion,
more than a tenfold increase in federal monies, but a year later the money had just been
appropriated. Bush, Securing the Homeland at 10-11 (cited in note 29); Philip Shenon, Threats
and Responses: Local Governments; Antiterror Money Stalls in Congress, NY Times Al (Feb 13,
2003); Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Worst Defense, NY Times A31 (Feb 20, 2003);
Philip Shenon, Domestic Securioy: In Reversal, White House Concedes That Counterterrorism Budget Is
Too Meager, NY Times A14 (Feb 27, 2003); Philip Shenon, Bush Administration to Seek
Emegeng Mong to Protect Against Terrorist Altacks in U.S., NY Times A22 (Mar 20, 2003).
77 See American Political Network, Bioterrorism Preparedness: States Not Ready for Potential Attack,
Report, American Health Line 7 (Nov 4, 2002) (describing the lack of preparedness of state
health authorities for mass casualties in the event of a bioterrorist attack).
78 Elaine M. Grossman, U.S. Offidals Mull a Military Role in Enforcing Smallpox Quaranine, Inside
the Pentagon (Dec 19, 2002). Grossman notes other experts who believe a massive
vaccination program quickly instituted after an attack would be likely to make a quarantine
regimen unnecessary. See also Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Judith Miller, BioTerrorism: Many Worry
That Nation Is Still Highbl Vulnerable to Germ Attack, NY Times A16 (Sept 9, 2002). For the
possibility of panic, see David Wood, America Is Vulnerable to Panic in Terror Attack, Experts
Say, Newhouse News Service (Aug 20, 2002). For a hint of the problems involved in
quarantine-the need for military involvement and the great dangers to lives and civil
liberties-see Smithson and Levy, Ataxia at 268-70 (cited in note 70).
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National Security Adviser for Counterterrorism.79 Northern Command's head,
General Eberhart, agrees: "There may be situations if we ever got into a major
chemical biological nuclear attack problem where we may, in fact, be in charge,"
but only if "it's become so bad that the lead federal agency in working with the
state governors say ... 'we give up.' ... And then the president and the Secretary
of Defense ... decide, 'yes, that is appropriate. '' ' 0 Assaults on the food supply,
water, or energy resources could provoke a massive deployment of available
people for response, recovery, and protection, so the possibilities of an incident
involving the military establishment are significant. Even if tens of thousands are
not pressed into service, the need for some of the specialized units-medical,
chem-bio, police, civil administration, and the like-might prove enormously
disruptive to military operations abroad. That -is the value of Northern
Command: to plan for such an event and to begin to think through the
coordination with local and state authorities. Thinking about the very worst
catastrophe-the explosion of nuclear weapons in American cities-goes back
several years at least. In December 2002, at the recommendation of a
commission created four years earlier "to advise the president and Congress on
domestic response to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction,"
discussions began "among various federal agencies" to "delineate a role for U.S.
troops, should local and state law enforcement authorities become
overwhelmed" by an attack using smallpox. 81 This same commission concluded
that it was nowhere clear, even after the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security, "which Federal agency" would be "in charge" of the federal
response to various kinds of attacks, and "who is in charge is especially
problematic when it comes to a bioterrorism attack. 8 2
The very planning of such responses with the thousands of federal, state,
county, and local public and private agencies and institutions by Northern
Command contains inherent dangers. Military staffs are among the most
effective planning organizations in American society. Their processes and
perspectives-their unstated assumptions-could begin to influence the
procedures and operations of state and local law enforcement agencies, fire
departments, emergency services providers, public health organizations, and
governmental agencies: militarizing them enough to harm the performance of
79 Quoted in Barton Gellman, In U.S., Terrorism's Peril Undiminished Nation Struggles on Offense and
Defense, and Officials Still Expect New Attacks, Wash Post Al (Dec 24, 2002).
80 Holman, The NewsHour With Jim Lehrer" Focus: Guarding the Homeland (cited in note 69). For the
full interview, see Interview by Dan Sagalyn with Air Force General Ralph Eberhart, Online
NewsHour (Sept 24, 2002), available online at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/
ata/eberhart.html> (visited Feb 28, 2003).
81 Grossman, U.S. Officials Mull a Military Role in Enforcing Smallpox Quarantine, Inside the
Pentagon (cited in note 78).
82 Gilmore Commn, Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress at iv (cited in note 74).
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their normal responsibilities. In the last two decades, the military model has
already invaded the American criminal justice system to an unprecedented
degree: the dramatic rise in numbers of SWAT teams; increased cooperation
between the military and police; "boot camps" in the correctional system; the
language, concepts, and mentality.8 3 American foreign relations likewise have
come more and more to be influenced by military concerns, understandings, and
the military itself, in ways unlike the era of the Cold War and quite beyond the
demands of a "war" on terrorism: a reliance on military commands to manage
many regional relationships or bilateral relations; the threat or use of force to
achieve American aims; the subordination of other interests to security beyond
the dictates of the war on terrorism. 4 An inadvertent militarization of domestic
society----quite beyond the uneven and diffuse ways in which the military has
come to pervade American civic life and culture after five decades of world and
cold war-arising indirectly, but unnecessarily, from the demands of homeland
security, while unforeseen, is possible. And lurking in the background, there is
always the possibility that military operations on American soil will result in
collateral damage and unintended violence and death, unless the regular military
devotes considerable time to training for a homeland role, with the resulting
degradation of its conventional war-fighting capability.
A third danger is the increasing blurring of the line between military and
civilian functions, in part because of convenience and in part because the
struggle against terrorism is likely to last indefinitely. In many respects the "war
on terrorism" is no war all, but a concerted (and hopefully coordinated) national
and international effort involving law enforcement, policing, diplomacy,
economic initiatives, and military operations to protect the United States against
radical Islamic terrorists. There has been no mobilization, no continuous
combat, no sudden heating up of the economy or rise in prices, no raising of
taxes, no call to sacrifice, no major interruption or upheaval of civilian life-the
kinds of experiences common to other wars in American history. In fact, just the
opposite has occurred. Americans were asked to "go back to normal" after 9/11,
83 See Dunlap, The Thick Green Line at 32 (cited in note 24).
84 See, for example, David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals
(Scribner 2001); Richard H. Kohn, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United
States Today, 60 Naval War C R 9 (Summer 2002); Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The
Realities & Consequences of U.S. Dilomafy (Harvard 2002); Dana Priest, The Mission (Norton
2003). For an argument that this trend is much broader than foreign policy alone and extends
back almost three generations, see Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States
Since the 1930s (Yale 1995).
85 My use of the term "militarization" follows Sherry's: "the process by which war and national
security became consuming anxieties and provided the memories, models, and metaphors
that shaped broad areas of national life." Sherry, In the Shadow of War at xi (cited in note 84).
My use includes the "caveats" he applies to the concept, including a certain blurriness and a
"varied and changing rather than uniform historical process" embracing "varied, even
discordant, phenomena." Id at xi-xii.
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to travel and spend, and were given no precise definition of the enemy, no
explicit articulation of a strategy to win the war, nor a description of what
victory would be, how the war would be waged, and when and how it might end.
Instead the government has repeated consistently that this war will last
indefinitely, and that it might involve combat at home. One of the government's
most senior, experienced counter-terrorism experts casts doubt on the "war"
paradigm: "I am disturbed by how often I hear references to 'as long as the
emergency lasts' or 'as long as the war on terrorism is going on.' ... What we are
doing has an indefinite run."
86
The greatest worry is the gradual transformation of military forces into
adjuncts of the law enforcement, domestic intelligence, and prosecutorial
functions that have heretofore been strictly civilian. This has happened before-
during almost every war since the rnid-19th century, with harm to American civil
liberties and to the relationship between the armed forces and the American
people. During the Civil War, the federal government used the Army to arrest,
try, and imprison thousands of citizens for disloyalty, many of them
Northerners, and some for statements or speeches that seemed to many at the
time to be legitimate dissent or opposition to the Lincoln administration and its
policies. Others were arrested on suspicion of profiteering, fraud, corruption, or
otherwise shady dealings relating to the government, and there were
documented cases of torture in the prisons.8" During World War I, some 2,300
of over 6,000 enemy aliens arrested by the Justice Department were "interned by
the military as dangerous to the national security."88 The Army and Navy
participated in government censorship of telegraph and cable messages,
newspapers, radio, and public speech. The Army broke strikes, raided labor
meetings and union headquarters, and harassed and suppressed radical labor
86 Paul Pillar, as quoted in Steve Hirsch, The War Against Terror Will Be Indefinite, Nad J 254 (Jan
26, 2002). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed similar views about the
conflict being indefinite. Bradley Graham, General to Troops: Sit Tight: In.Qatar, Myers Says No
End in Sight to War on Terrorism, Wash Post A18 (Dec 21, 2002). For the debate over whether
the struggle against terrorism is or should be a "war," see Donald H. Rumsfeld, A New Kind
of War, NY Times A21 (Sept 27, 2001); Richard H. Kohn, A War Like No Other, 29 OAH
Newsletter (Nov 2001), available online at <http://www.oah.org/pubs/nI/200lnov/kohn.
html> (visited Mar 7, 2003); Michael Howard, What's in a Name? How to Fight Terrorism, 81
Foreign Affairs 8 (Jan/Feb 2002); William M. Arkin, September 11 and Wars of the World,
Presentation at the US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island (Sept 25, 2002), available
online at <http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2002/10/11/arkin/print.html> (visited
Mar 20, 2003); Eliot A. Cohen, World War IV, Wall St J A18 (Nov 20, 2001); R. James
Woolsey, World War IV, Address at Restoration Weekend, Center for the Study of Popular
Culture (Nov 16, 2002), in FrontPageMagazine.com (Nov 22, 2002), available online at
<http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles/Printable.asp?ID=4718> (visited Mar 2, 2003).
87 See Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Fate of I'berty Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberies 94-103, 109-12
(Oxford 1991).
88 Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States 74 n 4 (Norton
1979).
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groups, often acting in the role of local law enforcement-arresting and
detaining suspects-as well as keeping order. In Seattle, the Office of Naval
Intelligence actually arrested Wobblies (members of the International Workers
of the World) on the docks and ships. Military Intelligence, which was, in the
words of an Army history, "consciously antiradical and antilabor," created over
500 units nationwide to spy on workers in war production plants in an attempt
to prevent sabotage.89 The Army connected not only with federal, state, and local
law enforcement, but with private patriotic and vigilante groups watching aliens
and radicals in what the history called a "machinery of repression" that in the
end acted to suppress dissent as well as guarantee the security of the
homefront.9 ° During the 1920s and 1930s, the War Department maintained and
updated plans to protect the country from domestic unrest and internal
revolution fomented by radicals, leftists, and pacifists, on whom military
intelligence collected information.9' During World War II, the Army advocated
and then carried out the evacuation of Japanese Americans from the West Coast
to "relocation centers" run by the civilian War Relocation Authority. 92 During
the Cold War, the Army gathered intelligence on civilian groups thought to be
radical or subversive, including civil rights and peace organizations. During the
Vietnam War, Army surveillance increased dramatically in size and scope: spying
on antiwar protest, investigating unrest on college campuses, monitoring racial
turmoil in American cities, and scrutinizing political dissent.93
The use of the military internally to support African-American voting
during Reconstruction influenced Congress, with the approval of the Army, to
pass the Posse Comitatus Act in 1878 in order to keep the regular Army from
being used to enforce the laws. The military establishment valued this
separation, not wishing to be diverted from its focus on war or to be perceived
as the tool of one set of Americans against another. Thus the armed forces
resisted eroding these restrictions in the 1980s to help interdict the importation
89 Laurie and Cole, The Role of Federal Militag Forces at 233, 253 (cited in note 22).
90 Id at 234. For a general discussion, see id at ch 10; William Preston, Jr., Aiens and Dissenters:
Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933 105-17, 161, 244-46 (Harvard 1963); Joan M.
Jensen, Arny Surveillance in America, 1775-1980 131-77 (Yale 1991).
91 Jensen, Army Surveillance at ch 9 (cited in note 90); Laurie and Cole, The Role ofFederal Militagy
Forces at ch 14 (cited in note 22).
92 See Stetson Conn, The Decision to Evacuate the Japanese From the Pacific Coast, in Greenfield, ed,
Command Decisions 125 (cited in note 18); Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd
W. Matson, Prejudice, War and the Constitution (California 1970); Roger Daniels, The Decision to
Relocate the Japanese Americans (Krieger reprint ed 1985); John Joel Culley, Enemy Alien Control
in the United States During World War II: A Survey, in Kay Saunders and Roger Daniels, eds,
Alien Justice: Wartime Internment in Australia and North America 138 (Queensland 2000); Sandra
C. Taylor, From Incarceration to Freedom: Japanese-Americans and the Departure From the Concentration
Camps, in Saunders and Daniels, supra at 205; Wendy Ng, Japanese American Internment During
World War II: A History and Reference Guide, ch 3 (Greenwood 2002).
93 Jensen, Army Surveillance at 240-47 (cited in note 90).
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of narcotics in the "war" on drugs.94 And the military continues to be troubled
by the tendency. As one student of the problem concluded four years before
9/11, "in recent years, Congress and the public have seen the military as a
panacea for domestic problems." 95 "Civilian law enforcement requires the
cognizance of individual rights and seeks to protect those rights, even if the
person being protected is a bad actor. Prior to the use of force, police officers
attempt to de-escalate a situation" and "are trained to use lesser forms of force
when possible." On the other hand, "soldiers" emphasize "deadly force."
"Escalation is the rule" and "in an encounter with a person identified with the
enemy, soldiers need not be cognizant of individual rights, and the use of deadly
force is authorized without any aggressive or bad act by that person.
' '1
6
The larger principle is this: that regular armed forces need to face outward,
against American enemies, rather than inward where a military force can become
an institution acting on behalf of one part of the community against another.
That corrodes the morale of the forces, harms recruiting, reduces readiness,
undermines the support of the country for the armed forces, and ultimately
drives a wedge between the military and society. Temporarily reinforcing civilian
agencies in border control or with drug interdiction, or to provide security for
the Olympics or sporting events like the Super Bowl seem, on the surface,
functional and helpful. For nearly two decades, regular military forces, including
Special Forces, have been aiding border control authorities along the Texas-
Mexico border and law enforcement organizations nationwide since the early
199 0 s. But when Marines inadvertently killed an innocent teenage goat herder in
1997, ground reconnaissance along the border ceased.97 Yet today, that same
border with Mexico presents a special challenge for keeping terrorists out of the
United States.98 Both the chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee and
General Eberhart of Northern Command have called for a review of the Posse
Comitatus Act limitations on domestic uses of the armed forces. 99 In January
94 See generally Jonathan A. Schmidt-Davis, The Origins of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878
(1999) (unpublished MA thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on file with the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill library); Dunlap, The Thick Green Line at 34-40
(cited in note 24). For a general discussion of policy reasons not to use the military to enforce
civilian laws, see Hammond, 75 Wash U L Q at 953-84 (cited in note 24).
95 Hammond, 75 Wash U L Q at 953 (cited in note 24).
96 Id at 973.
97 Timothy J. Dunn, Waging War on Immigrants at the U.S. -Mexico Border: Human Rights Implications,
in Kraska, ed, Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System 65 (cited in note 24).
98 Id at 76-77; Elaine M. Grossman, U.S.-Mexico Border Control a Wild Card for New Homeland
Command, Inside the Pentagon (Sept 26, 2002); Tim Weiner, U.S. and Mexico Coordinate Military
Effortsfor Mutual Protection Against Terror, NY Times B 13 (Mar 23, 2003).
99 See Carl Levin, Opening Statement of Senator Carl Levin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
Hearing on the Role of the Department of Defense in Homeland Securiy (Oct 25, 2001), available
online at <http://levin.senate.gov/floor/102501cs1.htm> (visited Mar 20, 2003); Interview
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2003, Undersecretary of Defense Edward "Pete" Aldridge asked the Defense
Science Board to review "what specific roles and missions" the military should
possess in homeland defense. Citing the great resources the military possesses,
Aldridge pointed out the "many ... systems engineering, technical capabilities,
relevant technologies, logistics expertise and modeling and simulation
capabilities needed for effective homeland security.
' 1°°
The problem in the end is not likely to arise from the military itself. Over a
century of concern about the use of regular forces internally, and over a decade
of discussion about the negative impact on war-fighting capabilities and civil
liberties, have made the uniformed leadership extremely wary of altering the
boundaries separating military and civil functions in law enforcement and
domestic operations.'0 ' Memories of using the Army against labor and radical
groups in World War I and to spy on antiwar protest during the Vietnam War
have dimmed but remain alive in institutional understanding. The danger lies in
public pressure exerted on the political leadership to act, and in turn a tendency
to use the military because it has the resources and the organizational
effectiveness to accomplish what the American public might demand.
The United States has experience with a national security state and its
excesses during World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. While the
domestic threat lies more in civilian counterintelligence, the use of the military
lies constantly in the background, particularly for those nightmares-the endless
"what ifs" in our imaginations-of one or more catastrophes involving weapons
of mass destruction, the results of which overwhelm not only temporary civilian
responders, but "consequence management" over the long term, and the
patience and willingness of the American people to balance security with
liberty. 2 Significantly, the courts, normally the bulwark of liberty in American
society, have consistently deferred to the military in the operation of the system
of military justice, and to the other branches and particularly the executive
branch on civil liberties in wartime, permitting infringements during war that
under other circumstances would not be allowed."3 The Supreme Court under
by Dan Sagalyn with Air Force General Ralph Eberhart, Online NewsHour (cited in note
80).
100 Quoted in William Matthews, Aldridge Calls for Study of U.S. Military's Role in Homeland Defense,
DefenseNews.com (jan 16, 2003). See also Ken Guggenheim, Warner Wants to Boost Military
Role, AP Online (Nov 13, 2002).
101 See, for example, Lawlor, Militagy Support of Civil Authorities, J Homeland Security (cited in
note 39).
102 The possibilities of internal surveillance and some implications for civil liberties are depicted
in Matthew Brzezinski, FortressAmeica, NY Times Mag 38 (Feb 23, 2003).
103 See Jonathan Lurie, The Role of the FederalJudiciay in the Governance of the American Military: The
United States Supreme Court and "Civil Rights and Supervision" Over the Armed Forces, in Kohn, ed,
The United States Mikiag Under the Constitution 405 (cited in note 11); William H. Rehnquist, All
the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime 221-25 (Knopf 1998); Diane H. Mazur, Rehnquist's
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William Rehnquist has gone further, adopting a doctrine that designates the
military "a society apart from civilian society," superior morally and culturally,
and essentially exempt from civilian judicial oversight. °4 Under this doctrine,
civilian control would be left exclusively to executive and legislative branches
that might, under future circumstances and without regard for traditional
constitutional and legal safeguards, give power and authority to the military
inside the United States, over American citizens. It is this blurring of
boundaries-the militarization of internal security and the possible use of the
military domestically-that poses the greatest danger.
Over two centuries ago, as the Constitutional Convention was concluding
its work and the members were signing the document, the aged scientist,
diplomat, and political leader Benjamin Franklin remarked that throughout the
convention's work he had speculated whether a sun carved on the back of the
President's chair was rising or setting. "But now at length I have the happiness
to know that it is a rising and not a setting Sun."'05 At the same time, Franklin
sensed the fragility of the experiment. Accosted outside the hall by a local
woman, "Well, Doctor, what have we got, a republic or a monarchy?' ''A
republic," Franklin responded, "if you can keep it."' 6
Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth Advance of Martial Law, 77 Ind L J 701 (2002);
Lewis, Marbugy v. Madison v. Ashcroft, NY Times at A17 (cited in note 38).
104 Mazur, Rehnquist's Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth Advance of Martial Law, 77
Ind LJ at 743 (cited in note 103), quoting Rehnquist in ParkervLevj, 417 US 733, 744 (1974).
See also id at 745, 754, 759, 765, 767, 769, 773, 785 (discussing various ways in which
Rehnquist places the military beyond civilian and constitutional oversight).
105 The words are James Madison's, recounting Franklin's remark. Madison's Notes (Sept 17,
1787), reprinted in Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 648 (Yale rev
ed 1937).
106 James McHenry's Notes, Papers of Dr. James McHengy on the Federal Convention of 1787, 11 Am
Hist Rev 595, 618 (1906) (punctuation added).
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